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O Comportamento dos Senadores 
Brasileiros: Analisando a Troca de 
Votos nas Comissões Fixas durante a 
52ª Legislatura
Resumo: Utilizando a metodologia de Análise de Redes Sociais, intentamos ana-
lisar se os políticos brasileiros trocam votos na aprovação de projetos de lei em 
busca de apoio futuro. Para tanto, buscamos primeiramente mapear o comporta-
mento, a atuação e os contatos dos Senadores da República Federativa do Brasil 
dentro das comissões fixas que tiveram qualquer movimentação durante a 52ª 
Legislatura, poderemos então ver quais são os Senadores mais atuantes e centrais 
em cada comissão. Após este mapeamento procuramos criar meios de análise 
para responder a questão teórica da existência ou não do logrolling no Senado 
Brasileiro. Anteriormente a análise empírica e resposta aos problemas propostos, 
apresentaremos a devida introdução teórica compreendida por uma revisão de 
literatura sobre os temas pertinentes, sejam eles puramente teóricos a respeito 
da troca de apoio, sejam eles analíticos a respeito do sistema político brasileiro.
Palavras-chave: Troca de Votos; Atividade Legislativa; Senado Brasileiro; 
Análise de Redes Sociais.
JEL: H3, H7, H77, H83
1.Introduction
The question regarding government intervention or the maintenance of a 
totally free system has divided theorists long ago. According to Hardin (1997), 
there are three reasons for the state existence: the supply of public goods, the 
coordination between agents and the maintenance of a stable evolution. The 
first reason has in its defenders authors like Adam Smith and David Hume, 
while the second gets support in Thomas Hobbes and others. Mueller (1997) 
says that the rising of government occurs in a way to fall the transactions costs 
in a society with many agents. Ostrom and Walker (1997) show institutions 
that are between the full liberalism and the total state, which arise to solve 
problems of collective action. 
As a famous economic example, Keynesian theory shows a model where the 
state is incorporated in a more explicit way to solve crisis and stabilize the 
economy, acting for this in a countercyclical way. So, the state would act in a 
similar way like the one proposed by Hardin (1997), Mueller (1997), Ostrom 
and Walker (1997), and others.
Thinking the agents inside the government as the agents in the conventional 
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economic theory, this work seeks to analyze the logrolling. We will seek to 
provide the means to prove whether or not this practice can be seen among 
Brazilian Senators in the period of the 52nd Legislature. For this we will map 
parliamentary activity within the fixed committees of the Senate regarding 
the issuance of opinions and judgment of bills.
Besides this introduction, the article has more two sections and a conclusion. 
In the first section, we will carry out the theoretical approach for the topic, 
presenting the reader with the concept of exchanging votes, how it can be done, 
some characteristics that make it easily practiced and a brief discussion of 
the Brazilian political game. The second section presents the empirical tests 
in an attempt to note down or not, the presence of exchanging votes within 
the fixed commissions of the Brazilian Senate. Our hypothesis is that we can 
observe exchanges between Senators.
1. Theoretical Approach
Apparently, the exchange of votes can be sentenced by most people, but there 
are cases where it appears as beneficial, although there are others in which it 
shows itself deleterious to society as a whole. Consider the following example:
 TABLE 1. BASIC LOGROLLING EXAMPLE
Voters Project X Project Y
A
B
C
7
-3
-3
-3
-3
7
Prepared by the authors
From table 1 we can see three voters (A, B and C) and two projects (X and Y). 
The numbers 7 and -3 represent the generated utility on people if the project 
is approved, or, it’s the benefit created to the voter when some project wins. 
In a simple majority rule, none project is accepted, because, if we look to the 
project X, B and C will vote against and, looking to project Y, A and B will 
have that behavior, in both cases we’ll have two votes against and one for, so, 
the total utility for this society with three persons will be zero. But if A and C 
agreed to exchange their votes, C voting for the X bill since A vote for the Y 
bill, both projects will be accepted and the total utility will be equal 2. In this 
case, logrolling can create a benefit to the society. But, if instead of using -3 
in the example, we use -4, to all negative numbers, logrolling would create an 
aggregate utility of -2, being a bad deal in an aggregated way.
So, we can conclude that logrolling introduces a new feature to the voting 
process: while majority rule considers the preferences in an ordinal way, 
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logrolling allows us to see the preferences and their intensity cardinally. Ac-
cording to Mueller (2009), the support exchange on projects exists because the 
preferences are not equal between the agents. Thus, the exchange prevents a 
minority very desirous of a given project to be bullied by a majority apparently 
indifferent to the same project. From the foregoing, we conclude that, to the 
exchange be beneficial, the rise in utility of the minority must be greater than 
the utility loss suffered by others involved in the transaction. In the previous 
example, the gain of the minority was 7, while the loss of the majority was 
equal to 6, thus generating an exchange beneficial, with final result of +1.
Carruba and Volden (2000) say that logrolling is easier when: there are few 
politicians, projects bring more benefits than costs, future has a big value, 
the reelection chance is very high, the coalitions are easy to be created and 
the voting rules are less inclusive. To Buchanan and Tullock (1990 [1962]), 
logrolling is difficult only in some situations, like referendums, because nobody 
knows when it will be the next event where the exchange can be concluded. 
Another source of problems to referendums is about the size of the popula-
tion, in this scenario, each person is a very little part of the voters’ universe.
Let’s now consider the question of intransitivity in the polls, assuming that 
there are three alternatives, A, B and C, and three agents, Charles, John and 
Mary:
TABLE 2. INDIVIDUAL TRANSITIVITY AND COLLECTIVE INTRANSITIVITY
A e B B e C A e C
A – 2 votes (Charles e John)
B – 1 vote (Mary)
B – 2 votes (Charles e Mary)
C – 1 vote (John)
C – 2 votes (John e Mary)
A – 1 vote (Charles)
Fonte: Wieting Jr. (1966)
Analyzing agents’ individual transitivity:
Charles John Mary
A is preferably than B C is preferably than A B is preferably than C
B is preferably than C A is preferably than B C is preferably than A
A is preferably than C C is preferably than B B is preferably than A
So, to all agents individually, transitivity is ok. But, from table 2 we can see 
that in an aggregate way, or, to all agents together transitivity does not exist. 
From the outcome vote board we have:
A is preferably than B
B is preferably than C
C is preferably than A
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This clearly shows intransitivity, or cyclical behavior. So, individual transiti-
vity doesn’t guarantee aggregate transitivity. According to Bernholz (1973), 
logrolling is possible only when social preferences are transitive, and at 
the same time, intransitive social preferences make logrolling impossible. 
Stratman (1997) says that the costs of an approved project should be paid by 
everyone, not only by the beneficiaries of it, creating in the latest the feeling 
that the project is cheaper than it really is. This creates an increase in the 
supply of these projects, generating a transfer of resources from the loser 
minority to the winner majority (coalition).
Let’s see another approach to show the benefits and harms of logrolling regar-
ding the stability and instability of coalitions. Since the previous example is a 
little confuse, because we never can get the social preference, and even if we 
could, we never know if the agents are telling the truth in a way to building a 
preference scale, according to Stratman (1997), if the coalitions are politically 
unstable the benefits of logrolling wouldn’t appear. 
This point starts another debate about exchanging votes: those who believe in 
instability pay attention to the dangers of logrolling, while proponents argue 
that the stability of logrolling generates benefits, in aggregate, because the 
agents are afraid to break a coalition, knowing that in the future they will be 
penalized if acting so treacherous.
Tullock (1981) shows a theoretical model using payoffs to say that people 
that are in same conditions don’t have interest in seek advantages positions 
if they can be betrayed in the future. So, if a coalition is formed in which all 
the agents have the same payoff in the agreement, there’ll be no reason for a 
treacherous behavior. Coleman (1967) like Tullock (1981) advocates stability 
based it in the agents’ credibility. Koford (1982) also comes out in defense of 
stability, minimizing the complexity of the political system, supposing that 
exchanges are performed only between the party leaders, in this way, with a 
small number of interactions, control and prediction of the behavior of allies 
become easier.
Bernholz (1978) is another author who argues in favor of stability presenting 
a mathematical model to show that, within interest groups well-founded, 
with long existence, coalitions formed with the intention of practicing explicit 
logrolling are stable over time.
Contextualizing the issue in Brazilian terms, there are works on logrolling 
in Brazil, such as Pereira and Mueller (2002), which state that the executive 
reward with projects individual legislators who vote in favor of the budget it 
proposed while Congressmen make use of this money for individual projects 
to be  re-elected at all costs. However, Figueiredo and Limongi (2002) disa-
gree with this assertion and say that in Brazil, the preferences of politicians 
are not homogeneous in the quest for reelection, as it is in the U.S., where 
politicians seek close ties with their constituencies, to ensure a new mandate.
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Pereira and Mueller (2003) countered by saying that, in Brazil, there is, on the 
one hand, a weak link party, in the electoral arena, in which candidates seek 
his constituency alone and not rely heavily on the party, while on the other 
hand, in the legislative arena, the dependence to the political party is very 
strong, for he needs the help of the latter to obtain funds with the Executive 
in order to achieve their individual projects. From this fact, and contrary to 
what was proposed by Figueiredo and Limongi (2002), Pereira and Mueller 
(2003) state, based on empirical tests, that the greater the number of indivi-
dual amendments executed, the greater the chance of re-election, concluding 
that parties in the electoral arena are weak, and strong in the legislative, thanks 
to logrolling between the executive and party leaders. About the stability of 
coalitions internally, Wolf (2008) shows that, in the Brazilian House of Re-
presentatives, during the 52nd Legislature (2003-2006), the alliance between 
politicians can be considered stable.
It is not our main objective, we will not make an extensive analysis about 
logrolling and its relation with majority rule problems, but if the reader want 
to learn more about the question you can find some good works on Buchanan 
and Tullock (1990 [1962]), Tideman (1997), Enelow (1997), Peyton Young 
(1997), Schofield (1997), Mueller (2009), Shepsle and Weingast(1981) and 
the theorems of May, Condorcet, Black and Plott.
2. Empirical Analysis1
Reviewed the literature, we will make now the empirical analysis of the data, 
with the aim of mapping the network of contacts of Brazilian Senators in the 
52nd Legislature, within the fixed commissions of the Senate. Our database 
consists of the opinions offered by the rapporteur to a given bill introduced 
by another Senator, in a permanent committee of the Senate. According to 
the Article 126 of the laws of the Senate: the appointment of a rapporteur, 
independent of matter and committee meeting will follow the party represen-
tations or proportion of the parliamentary groups in that area; will alternate 
between its members and far will be in two business days after the receipt of 
the project. The article 133 of the same book says that: every opinion shall 
be conclusive in its analysis (Brazil, 2007), then, based on this information, 
we know that the choice of a rapporteur follows the partisan criteria and if a 
vote is favorable or unfavorable. 
The material of this paper is the opinion of bills, more precisely, the settlement 
of opinions given by one Senator to another in bills of the latter agent - the 
analysis of settlement opinions is used because we cannot consider a Senator 
who received 5 favorable opinions of a colleague, for example, successful in 
his projects, if he received 10 negative opinions of the same colleague in the 
same period. In this hypothetical example, the Senator concerned would have 
1 For more details about the research methodology, the reader may consult Batagelj, De Nooy and Mrvar 
(2009), Caladarelli (2007) and Scott (2009). 
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a settlement of -5, i.e., computing his successes and failures, the agent had a 
bad result, on average, being this relationship described as dotted lines on the 
graph with value -5. So, in the Social Network Analysis2 and based on visual 
observations obtained from the graphs generated, a favorable settlement of 
Senator A to bills introduced by Senator B is represented by an arrow filled, 
with its origin in A and target in B. If the settlement is negative (more negative 
opinions received than that positive ones) the relationship is represented, as 
already said, by a dotted arrow with origin in A and destination in B. That 
is, the lines in question could become thicker according to the value of the 
settlement: they will be darker and thicker in direct relation to the size of the 
settlement. Another concept is the settlement of some Senator connections 
with all his colleagues: if an agent receives positive settlement of 4 colleagues 
and negatives of 3, he has a positive settlement of links equal to 1, and we 
use this concept to measure his popularity in committee - called indegree.
Besides the interaction graphs, the methodology employed subsidized us with 
several indexes that will be analyzed whenever deemed necessary. It must 
be said that only the permanent committees of the Senate will be analyzed, 
because the mixed ones (Senate and House of Representatives) and the 
temporaries are not used to propose bills and the committees of inquiry also 
don’t have the characteristics of the study, primarily serving as legislative 
investigation. The commissions analyzed will be: Economic Affairs  Com-
mittee (CAE)3, Social Affairs Committee (CAS), Committee of Constitution, 
Justice and Citizenship (CCJ), Committee of Education, Culture and Sport 
(CE), Committee on Environment, Consumer Protection and Surveillance 
and Control (CMA), Commission on Human Rights and Legislation (CDH); 
Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense (CRE), Committee of 
Services on Infrastructure (CI), Regional Development and Tourism Com-
mission (CDR)4. The period of analysis is, once again, the 52nd Legislature, 
which starts in 2003 January the 1st, and ends in 2006 December the 31st. 
Finally, we will conduct an intercommittee analysis, in order to observe if 
exist a more complex support characterized as follows: The agent A provides 
support to the agent B in commission X, since the agent B offers its support 
to agent A in the commission Y.
There’s also a comment about the period of office of a Senator be eight years 
and the period of analysis be only four: this is because the election for the 
office is done to interleave the candidates with the three state representatives 
not being chosen only at the same time, so if we use a period of analysis of 
eight years, we assume the risk of look at a Senator for eight years and four 
Senators for four years each.
  
3 All the acronyms are regarding the names of the committees in Portuguese. 
4 The Commission of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and the Committee on Science, Technology, Innovation, 
Communication and Computing will not be analyzed because, during the four years, none opinion was issued 
on those centers of parliamentary discussion.
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We intend to analyze the performance of the Senators within each permanent 
commission, and also, in an intercommittee view, identifying its performance 
and interaction with parliamentary colleagues, we’ll also try to identify the 
most active Senators and the characteristics of the connections between 
these agents (general purpose). We further aim to determine whether the 
proposition of the existence of logrolling is valid for the selected data (spe-
cific objective). At the end, we intend to answer the following question: did 
logrolling exist inside fixed commissions of the Brazilian Senate, during the 
period of the 52nd Legislature? 
Like every model, ours also has its limitations. We know that the political 
process is extremely complex, with links between different types of agents 
belonging to the three spheres of power, and such links do not always focus on 
politics. In addition, a support offered in this term should not necessarily be 
reciprocated in the same period temporally but it could in future legislatures. 
However, the large number of ramifications presented by the Brazilian political 
process, lead us to draw a sharp boundary to our analysis, we observed the 
behavior of Senators only within fixed commissions of the Brazilian Senate 
for the period indicated. We believe that the methodology of social network 
analysis is best suited for the study of the recent past, because we assume that 
inferences about the future behavior of the agents are difficult to conclusion, 
after all we handle data with high volatility, which vary according to the po-
litical atmosphere of the country.
2.1. Economic Affairs Committee (CAE)
The first committee to be analyzed is the Economic Affairs Committee. The 
figure below shows the settlement of opinion in the Commission.
The density of the committee as a whole is equal to 0.02125, this is, agents do 
not interact strongly with each other because of 100 possible connections only 
2.12 in fact exist. Note that a network of maximum density in a high-traffic 
commission is absolutely unlikely, because of the large number of projects that 
are presented. It would be unlikely that all Senators interact with each other.
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FIGURE 1. CAE SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
We find in the network 83 connections between 63 different Senators. Each 
Senator interacts on average with 2.63 other Senators, i.e., that network is 
not concentrated, which is evidenced by the low degree of centralization 
index (0.1393).
The main actors being transmitters or receivers of opinion are the Senators 
César Borges (PR-BA) and Paulo Paim (PT-RS), with eleven links in all. 
Considering agents as emitters of opinions, the outdegree, Valdir Raupp 
(PMDB-RO), Flexa Ribeiro (PSDB-PA), Antonio Carlos Valadares (PSB-UP) 
and Eduardo Azeredo (PSDB-MG) appear at the top of the list, each one of 
them giving opinions to four different colleagues.
Searching a measure of popularity (the number of colleagues who sent their 
opinions) through indegree, Paulo Paim and César Borges appear at the first 
and second on opinions received, eleven and nine colleagues respectively. 
However, the first has six negative connections (dashed arrows) and five po-
sitive (filled arrows), giving a settlement equal to -1, which can lead to some 
misunderstanding about his popularity in general.
About the centrality measure, individually we observe that the points with hi-
gher values  are once again Paim and César Borges (PR-BA). The more intense 
relationship is between Ana Julia Carepa (PT-PA) and José Agripino Maia 
(DEM-RN), which shows that the Senator offered four positive opinions to 
the representative of Rio Grande do Norte. The fact that these Senators come 
from ideological party tendencies usually considered opposites leads us to 
consider this fact as evidence of a weak exchange of support between them6.
6 Of course, this and other similar relations can just be coincidence about the content of the bills and the 
preferences of the  rapporteurs about the subjects.
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Like one of the objectives of this study is to test the proposition of logrolling, 
we seek a measure that shows reciprocal trades sharply, or, exchanges actually 
performed. Assuming the example of the settlement from A to B is +5, we 
have to get the settlement from B to A, assuming B issued positive opinions 
for seven projects authored by A and three against, then we would have a po-
sitive settlement of +4. In this case, to compute the exchange of votes between 
agents A and B, and the settlement of A "B equal to +5 and the settlement B 
"A equals +4, we can then compute exchanging votes on bills to the pair in 
question the value +4. Thus, for obtaining the settlement of trade, we must 
consider the value that both relations have in common7. This is our parameter 
to identify strong evidence of trade between the Senators. However, other 
trends can be observed, which we classify as weak evidence of support or 
exchange, for example, the unilateral relationship already identified between 
Carepa and Agripino Maia, which leads us to believe that the strong support 
offered here could be reciprocated in another field or time. Using this method, 
we can conclude that in the Economic Affairs Committee there were no sharp 
exchanges between the parliamentary, but not forgetting the evidence found 
in the relations between Agripino Maia and Carepa.
2.2. Social Affairs Committee (CAS)
For the Social Affairs Committee, applying the calculation to obtain the set-
tlement of opinions, we arrive at figure 2. The average number of connections 
reaches 2.57 average links of each Senator to peers. Among the 56 senators 
present in the network, there are 72 connections. The most significant con-
nection is between Geraldo Mesquita Junior (PMDB-AC) and Paulo Paim 
(PT-RS), with the first offering four positive opinions to the second. In fact, 
as the positive link between Ana Julia Carepa (PT-PA) and José Agripino 
Maia (DEM-RN) at CAE led us to the assumption of weak evidence in sup-
port of trade, this link between the Senators of Acre and Rio Grande do Sul 
also leads us to believe that there is a support that will be repaid in another 
political field or timeline.
At the Commission on Social Affairs, Paulo Paim has relationship (positive 
and negative) with 22 other colleagues, followed by Marcelo Crivella (PRB-
-RJ), who has a degree 9. As a consequence, the central point in the network 
is represented by this gaucho PT Senator. The second and third places, in 
the aspect of centrality, are occupied by Mão Santa (PSC-PI) and Crivella, 
while Reginaldo Duarte (PSDB-CE) and Euripides Camargo (PT-DF) have a 
measure of centrality of zero. Like an element acting as a “bridge” among his 
colleagues, appears once again Paulo Paim.
7 We don’t consider the kind of projects carried out, just the number of them.
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FIGURE 2. CAS SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
Testing the hypothesis of logrolling, we see two reciprocities in the network. 
The first is observed between Marcelo Crivella and Paulo Paim: the first 
issued a positive opinions settlement of three to the second8, receiving in 
return only one, i.e., the observed exchange between agents is equal to one. 
The second reciprocity occurs between Patricia Saboya (PDT-EC) and Lúcia 
Vânia (PSDB-GO): the first issued a positive settlement of magnitude 1 for 
the second, getting a settlement of this same magnitude but negative, which 
does not allow us to consider it like a logrolling relation. Finally the Senator 
most representative of this commission is, once again, Paim. As a conclusion 
of the test for the logrolling, we have no strong evidence that lead us to believe 
that this is done in this committee, since only a small exchange of intensity 
was observed, but not forgetting the evidence found in the relations between 
Mesquita Junior and Paulo Paim.
2.3. Committee of Constitution, Justiceand Citizenship (CCJ)
Regarding CCJ, we can see that this committee is the one which has the highest 
number of bills proposed and analyzed in the period. 
Generally speaking the network above has low density, i.e., despite being the 
committee with the highest number of feedbacks or opinions sent, they are 
send by a small group of Senators inside the committee. Each agent is con-
nected on average to 1.91 colleagues. The relationship more intense is up to 
8 A strong link.
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Demóstenes Torres (DEM-GO) and Pedro Simon (PMDB-RS), parliamentary 
with distinct regions and ideology, which leads us to assert that this is a weak 
evidence of some kind of parliamentary support.
FIGURE 3. CCJ SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
The analysies shows that Paulo Paim (PT-RS) received favorable opinions 
from nine peers and only three colleagues offered him just contrary opinions. 
So, his settlement of links is equal to six. Pedro Simon received favorable opi-
nions from six Senators, and negative feedbacks to his bills from seven agents, 
having a settlement of links equal to -1. Demóstenes Torres, has an indegree 
of 3. The most popular Senator inside the committee is, again, Paulo Paim. 
But now, he doesn’t have centrality and betweeness characteristics, these are 
characteristics of Simon and Torres respectively. 
Testing the logrolling hypothesis, we find, like in CAS, only two reciprocity 
between the vertices. The first one belongs to Romeu Tuma (PTB-SP) and 
Pedro Simon. The former sent a settlement of +1 to the latter while Simon 
did the same. The second relation regards to Jefferson Peres (PDT-AM) and 
Marcelo Crivella (PRB-RJ): the first sent a settlement of +1 to the second 
receiving from him a settlement of -1. As a conclusion of the test of logrolling, 
we have no strong evidence that this is done in this committee, since only 
a small intensity exchange was observed. We also can see that the most re-
presentative Senators in this commission were Demóstenes Torres, Pedro 
Simon and Paulo Paim.
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2.4. Committee of Education, Culture and Sport (CE)
The Committee of Education, Culture and Sport has a small number of bills 
analyzed in the period, the net regarding the settlement of opinions gave by 
the rapporteurs follows:
FIGURE 4. CE SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
Observing figure 4, we can infer that agents with greater settlement of con-
nections, sending or receiving opinions are senators Paulo Paim (PT-RS) 
and Wellington Salgado (PMDB-MG), with a degree equal to three. This 
commission also found no evidence of logrolling.
2.5. Minor Movement Committees
Here we’ll show the settlement of opinions in the committees with a small 
number of bills judged in the period. Unfortunately, because this small 
number, Social Network Analysis measures cannot be computed, and we’ll 
concentrate only in the visual observation of the nets.
During the four years of the 52nd Legislature only one bill was analyzed in 
this committee, with a negative opinion gave to Serys Slhessarenko from 
César Borges. 
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FIGURE 5. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND TOURISM COMMISSION (CDR) 
SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
FIGURE 6. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGISLATION (CDH) 
SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
An analysis of this net shows that only three opinions were given in the period 
of analysis.
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FIGURE 7. COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT, CONSUMER PROTECTION 
AND SURVEILLANCE AND CONTROL (CMA) SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
Just four Senators acted as author or rapporteurs in this committee. A very 
low movement committee.
FIGURE 8. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL DEFEN-
SE (CRE) SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
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FIGURE 9. COMMITTEE OF SERVICES ON INFRASTRUCTURE  
(CI) SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
Like the others minor movement committees, these last two showed in sum 
a small index of parliamentary activity.
We still can see that the Commission of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform 
(CRA), and the Committee on Science, Technology, Innovation, Communica-
tion and Computing (CCT) had no bills analyzed in the period, which shows 
a very less intense parliamentary activity in those fields of interests.
2.6. Intercommitte analysis
As in the analysis of separate committees we couldn’t find strong evidence 
that the logrolling was practiced in the Brazilian Senate, before we reject our 
hypothesis (that the logrolling exists within the proposed limits) we will hold 
a final test to see if the Senators interact between commissions, practicing a 
kind of support less visible characterized by the following conduct: a Senator 
offers support to a colleague in a given committee, since this fellow return 
the vote in another committee. To this we add the settlement of opinions on 
all committees already analyzed.
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FIGURE 10. INTERCOMMITTEE SETTLEMENT OF OPINIONS
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
The figure above represents the settlement of opinions, summed on all com-
mittees that had movement in the period analyzed. In a pooled analysis, only 
3.9% of the possible relations are actually executed: each Senator has on ave-
rage 6.86 connections (positive or negative) with other colleagues. Senators 
with more connections are Paulo Paim (PT-RS), César Borges (PR-BA) and 
Demóstenes Torres (DEM-GO) with 32, 22 and 21 links, overall, respectively, 
disregarding their direction, intensity and support position. From the graph 
we also extract the full support exchange between agents, using the same 
methodology employed in the analysis of separate committees, the interaction 
in both senses of the total network is given by the following table:
From Table 3 we observe that only the relations made  by the letters C, D 
and E may be considered exchanging votes among parliamentarians. Note 
that the few exchanges observed previously in some two committees do not 
necessarily remain, imagine that in a given commission an agent offered a 
settlement of +3 to a colleague, getting back a settlement of +2, bringing the 
trade settlement equal to +2 in the committee, while in another committee 
the values  of the settlement between the agents are identical, but with signs 
reversed, i.e., -3, -2 and -2: the commissions aggregating settlement of trade 
between these agents, in an intercommittee analysis, would become zero.
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TABLE 3. BIDIRECTIONAL INTERCOMMITTEE RELATIONS
Relation Rapporteur Author
Settlement of reports 
sent favorable (+) or 
against (-)
Exchange 
settlement
A
Jefferson Peres
Marcelo Crivella
Marcelo Crivella
Jefferson Peres
+1
-1
0
B
Lúcia Vânia
Patricia Saboya
Patricia Saboya
Lúcia Vânia
-1
+1
0
C
Marcelo Crivella Paulo Paim +3
+1
Paulo Paim Marcelo Crivella +1
D
Pedro Simon Romeu Tuma +1
+1
Romeu Tuma Pedro Simon +1
E
Paulo Paim Papaléo Paes +1
+1
Papaléo Paes Paulo Paim +2
F
Paulo Paim Valdir Raupp +1
0
Valdir Raupp Paulo Paim -1
G
Paulo Paim Ant. Valadares +1
0
Ant. Valadares Paulo Paim -1
H
Romero Jucá Augusto Botelho +1
0
Augusto Botelho Romero Jucá -1
Developed by the authors, from Senate data.
We also note that the interaction between the Senators in exchange for sup-
port intercommittee is poor, with very few clearest exchanges within a large 
universe of data, refuting the existence of logrolling in fixed commissions of 
the Senate, whether analyzed independently or jointly.
Conclusions
In this article we wanted to study the exchange of votes between politicians. 
Making use of the social network analysis, we observed that in the Economic 
Affairs Committee, the agents did not interact strongly with each other, with 
only 2.12% of all possible connections done. We also note that the Senator 
most popular - who received a positive settlement of opinions, from a largest 
number of colleagues - was César Borges (PR-BA).
In the Social Affairs Committee, Paulo Paim (PT-RS) figured as the agent 
who had connections with the largest number of colleagues (22 in all). In 
this committee, we realized that the more “productive” agents were Paim and 
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Marcelo Crivella (PRB-RJ). There was also a reciprocity in the relationship 
between Patricia Saboya (PDT-EC) and Lúcia Vânia (PSDB-GO), although 
this reciprocity cannot be considered as evidence of logrolling because it 
occurred with low intensity.
The Committee of Constitution, Justice and Citizenship, the most crowded 
of the Senate, the most active Senator was Paulo Paim. The more intense 
relationship competed to Demóstenes Torres  (DEM-GO) and Pedro Simon 
(PMDB-RS). As the Committee on Social Affairs, only one reciprocity was 
observed, between Romeu Tuma (PTB-SP) and Simon. However, this relation 
did not submit sufficient intensity that we might consider that the logrolling 
was or not practiced.
Intercommittee analysis showed us that we cannot affirm that the Senators 
practice exchange of votes between fixed commissions of the Senate. A fact 
noted was the low (or zero in some cases) movement in many committees of 
the Senate, preventing any analysis of trade support regarding these centers 
of parliamentary discussion.
We conclude that the logrolling was not observed within the limits imposed 
by our model for the Brazilian Federal Senate in the period on the 52nd Le-
gislature (2003-2006). The Senators, in this strict sense, behave random in 
opinions, there was no clear collusion between agents observed in the same 
(or different) party base (ideology), or geographic region of the country. One 
last finding point was the low congressional activity in a big number of Senate 
committees.
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